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THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWER 
Louis Fisher* 
The unitary executive model, if reasonably applied, has much to 
commend it.  The Framers experienced first-hand the administrative 
problems of the Continental Congress from 1774 to 1787 and 
brought with them to the Philadelphia Convention a determination 
to structure government in a manner that would better assure ac-
countability and efficiency.  A single executive in the form of the 
President was a key step toward improved management.  When Con-
gress created three executive departments in 1789, it expressed a sim-
ilar commitment to accountability by placing authority in a secretary, 
not in a board.  At the same time, the principle of a unitary executive 
has had to compete with other important values.  The purpose of my 
Article is to examine some of the compromises with the unitary ex-
ecutive model, beginning in 1789.  I then will move to analyzing the 
concept of “inherent executive power” and its dangers to constitu-
tional government.  The model of a unitary executive, if properly un-
derstood, is compatible with the Constitution.  Inherent executive 
power is not. 
I.  THE SEARCH FOR A UNITARY EXECUTIVE 
The Framers had plenty of strong executive models from which to 
choose.  They could look to John Locke, who emphasized the need 
for independent executive action.  He understood that the legislature 
could not always be in sitting, nor could it provide laws to cover every 
contingency:  “It is not necessary—no, nor so much as convenient—
that the legislative should be always in being; but absolutely necessary 
that the executive power should, because there is not always need of 
new laws to be made, but always need of execution of the laws that 
are made.”1  Although Locke divided government into legislative and 
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executive institutions to provide for checks and balances, he placed 
what he called the federative power (foreign policy) solely with the 
executive.  His federative power included “the power of war and 
peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions with all persons 
and communities without the commonwealth.”2  The federative pow-
er was “always almost united” with the executive.3  Separating the ex-
ecutive and federative powers, he warned, would invite “disorder and 
ruin.”4 
William Blackstone, in his Commentaries, agreed that in external af-
fairs the King was the sole authority.  The British Constitution placed 
those powers in the hand of the executive “for the sake of unanimity, 
strength, and dispatch.”5  In the “exertion of lawful prerogative, the 
king is and ought to be absolute; that is, so far absolute, that there is 
no legal authority that can either delay or resist him.”6  In the exer-
cise of those prerogatives the King “is irresistible and absolute.”7  With 
regard to foreign policy, the King “is the delegate or representative of 
his people.”8  Individuals of a state, even in a collective capacity, could 
not possibly “transact the affairs of that state with another community 
equally numerous as themselves.  Unanimity must be wanting to their 
measures, and strengths to the execution of their counsels.”9 
The concept of the executive as a channel for foreign communi-
cations later would take the form of the President as “sole organ,” a 
doctrine badly misconstrued over the years to vest exclusive power in 
the President in the fields of foreign affairs and national security.  
Justice Sutherland popularized the sole-organ theory in dicta in-
cluded in his United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. decision.10  The 
dicta included a speech by John Marshall on March 7, 1800, during 
his service with the House of Representatives, when he called the 
President “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and 
its sole representative with foreign nations.”11  The full context of the 
speech, however, makes it clear that Marshall meant that after the two 
branches had decided national policy, either by statute or by treaty, it 
was the President’s duty to inform other nations of our policy and to 
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execute the law.  Nothing in Marshall’s long career as Secretary of 
State, member of Congress, or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
ever advocated exclusive, plenary, or extra-constitutional powers for 
the President in the field of foreign affairs or the war power.12 
Locke argued that the executive had to be free in time of emer-
gency to act in the absence of law and sometimes even against it, for 
the legislature was not always capable of acting effectively in such 
moments.  The power to act “according to discretion for the public 
good, without the prescription of the law and sometimes even against 
it, is that which is called prerogative.”13  Locke imposed a few condi-
tions on the prerogative.  It had to be used for the good of the people 
“and not manifestly against it.”14  But what would happen if an execu-
tive abused the power?  Locke saw no possible secular check.  In such 
disputes “there can be no judge on earth.”15  For their grievances the 
people had no other remedy “but to appeal to Heaven.”16  The Amer-
ican Framers did not look to the skies for help.  They sought struc-
tural checks in a written constitution. 
II.  UNITARY EXECUTIVE AND WAR 
The delegates at the Philadelphia Convention debated the differ-
ences between the British model and the American alternative.  The 
power of peace and war associated with the monarchy would not be 
given to the President.  Charles Pinckney said he was for “a vigorous 
Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of <the existing> Con-
gress might extend to peace & war &c which would render the Execu-
tive a Monarchy, of the worst kind, towit an elective one.”17  John Rut-
ledge was comfortable with placing the executive power in a single 
person, “tho’ he was not for giving him the power of war and 
peace.”18  James Wilson backed a single executive but “did not con-
sider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in de-
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fining the Executive powers.  Some of these prerogatives were of a 
Legislative nature.  Among others that of war & peace &c.”19 
Edmund Randolph expressed his concerns about executive pow-
er, calling it “the fœtus of monarchy.”20  His colleagues, he said, had 
“no motive to be governed by the British Governmt. as our proto-
type.”21  If there were no other alternative, he might be inclined to 
adopt the British model, but “the fixt genius of the people of America 
required a different form of Government.”22  Wilson agreed that the 
British model “was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the 
extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that 
nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.”23  The 
words “republic” and “republican government” may mean little to 
Americans today.  To the Framers, republican government expressed 
the central values of self-government and popular sovereignty. 
At the Philadelphia Convention, Alexander Hamilton expressed 
his admiration for the British model.  In his “private opinion he had 
no scruple in declaring . . . that the British Govt. was the best in the 
world.”24  He nonetheless discarded the Lockean and Blackstonian 
models and proposed that the President would have “with the advice 
and approbation of the Senate” the power of making treaties.25  The 
extent of the break with English precedents is set forth clearly in 
Hamilton’s Federalist No. 69, where he explained that the President 
has “concurrent power with a branch of the legislature in the forma-
tion of treaties,” whereas the British King “is the sole possessor of the 
power of making treaties.”26  He noted that the power over foreign af-
fairs was deliberately shared between the President and Congress.  He 
compared the war power in England and America.  The power of the 
King “extends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating 
of fleets and armies.”27  Unlike the King of England, the President 
“will have only the occasional command of such part of the militia of 
the nation as by legislative provision may be called into the actual ser-
vice of the Union.”28  The British King was not similarly constrained. 
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With regard to the war power, the Framers recognized that the 
President needed limited defensive powers in times of emergencies, 
but the decision to take offensive action—to take the country from a 
state of peace to a state of war—was reserved to Congress alone.  Ini-
tially, delegates at the Philadelphia Convention gave Congress the 
power to “make war.”29  As the debate proceeded, they worried that 
Congress might not be in session during an emergency or would not 
be able to respond quickly and effectively.  The language was 
changed to give Congress the power to “declare” war, leaving to the 
President “the power to repel sudden attacks.”30  The President was 
never given a general power to move the country into full-scale war or 
mount an offensive attack against another country.  Roger Sherman 
agreed that the President “shd. be able to repel and not to com-
mence war.”31  Elbridge Gerry said he “never expected to hear in a 
republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.”32  
George Mason spoke “agst giving the power of war to the Executive, 
because [the executive was] not <safely> to be trusted with it . . . . He 
was for clogging rather than facilitating war.”33 
Similar remarks appear at the state ratifying conventions.  James 
Wilson said that the system of checks and balances 
[W]ill not hurry us into war; it is calculated to guard against it.  It will not 
be in the power of a single man, or a single body of men, to involve us in 
such distress; for the important power of declaring war is vested in the 
legislature at large . . . .34 
The Framers empowered Congress to initiate war because they feared 
that Presidents, in their search for fame and glory, possessed a natu-
ral appetite for war.  John Jay warned in The Federalist No. 4 that 
[A]bsolute monarchs will often make war when their nations are to get 
nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such as a 
thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or pri-
vate compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or parti-
sans.  These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of 
the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice 
or the voice and interests of his people.35 
Jay’s sentiments were echoed by others.  James Madison, writing in 
1793, called war 
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[T]he true nurse of executive aggrandizement. . . . In war, the honours 
and emoluments of office are to be multiplied; and it is the executive pa-
tronage under which they are to be enjoyed.  It is in war, finally, that lau-
rels are to be gathered; and it is the executive brow they are to encircle.  
The strongest passions and most dangerous weaknesses of the human 
breast; ambition, avarice, vanity, the honourable or venial love of fame, 
are all in conspiracy against the desire and duty of peace.36 
Five years later, writing to Thomas Jefferson, Madison remarked that 
the Constitution “supposes, what the History of all Govts demon-
strates, that the Ex. is the branch of power most interested in war, & 
most prone to it.  It has accordingly with studied care, vested the 
question of war in the Legisl.”37 
III.  THE UNITARY MODEL IN PRACTICE 
When the First Congress assembled in 1789, lawmakers had to de-
cide a number of constitutional questions not resolved by the Fram-
ers.  Drawing on their experience with the Continental Congress, it 
was understood that the new executive departments being created 
(Foreign Affairs, Treasury, and War) should be run by a single execu-
tive, not an unaccountable board of multiple officials.  At the head of 
each department would be a Secretary appointed by the President 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, but the bill added:  “and to 
be removable by the President.”38  The Constitution did not expressly 
provide for a presidential removal power.  Was it somehow implied?  
Lawmakers had to decide that question on the basis of first principles 
of government, with no assistance from the courts.  It would be many 
years before the federal judiciary would provide guidance on the type 
of constitutional issues that the members of Congress debated and 
resolved in 1789. 
A.  The Removal Power 
From May 19 through June 24, 1789, the House of Representatives 
explored the scope of the removal power in great detail, with law-
makers divided on the legitimate sources of presidential power.39  
Some argued that the removal power would make the President re-
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sponsible for the conduct of department heads, consistent with the 
President’s constitutional duty to see that laws be faithfully executed; 
others wanted the removal power shared with the Senate.40  Unable to 
reconcile these conflicting positions, the House decided to the treat 
the removal power by implication, not declaration.  The words “and 
to be removable by the President” were stricken in favor of language 
providing that the chief clerk in the department would take charge of 
all records whenever the Secretary “shall be removed from office” by 
the President.41 
The Senate was closely divided on the President’s removal power, 
producing tie votes and requiring Vice President John Adams to cast 
a vote to protect presidential interests.42  In the end, Congress passed 
legislation to adopt the identical procedure for the three executive 
departments.  Subordinate officers would have charge and custody of 
all records whenever the Secretary “shall be removed from office by 
the President of the United States.”43 
Agreement on the President’s power to remove department heads 
did not include a freedom to remove every official in the executive 
branch.  During debate on the Treasury Department and the office of 
the Comptroller, Madison intervened to protect that individual from 
presidential removal.  He explained that the properties of the Comp-
troller were not “purely of an Executive nature” but embodied “a Ju-
diciary quality as well as Executive; perhaps the latter obtains in the 
greatest degree.”44  Because of the mixed nature of this position, 
“there may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not 
hold his office at the pleasure of the Executive branch of the Gov-
ernment.”45 
It may seem odd for Madison to speak with such command about 
the nature of an office that was being created.  How did he know, in 
looking forward, that the Comptroller would be exercising quasi-
judicial duties?  The answer is that Madison need only look backward 
at the actions of the Continental Congress in 1781 when it created a 
Superintendent of Finance, auditors, and a Comptroller.  The latter 
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was responsible for the settlement of public accounts.46  On all ap-
peals, he “shall openly and publicly hear the parties, and his decision 
shall be conclusive.”47 
B.  Adjudicatory Duties 
The precedent of the Comptroller’s office, a modest one, would 
be later extended to cover any type of adjudicatory work done in fed-
eral agencies, including decisions by administrative law judges or ex-
ecutive officials in matters involving various claims and benefits.  
Here is a central claim by Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo: 
[A]ll forty-three presidents, from George Washington to George W. 
Bush, have insisted on the view that the Constitution gives them the pow-
er to remove and direct subordinates as to law execution.  All forty-three 
presidents have refused to acquiesce in repeated congressional efforts to 
sabotage the unitary executive bequeathed to us by the framers.48 
This claim reaches too far.  To Madison and his colleagues in the 
First Congress, the Comptroller was immune from the removal pow-
er, either by the President or the department head, unless the Comp-
troller’s actions prevented the law from being faithfully carried out.  
Otherwise, he was independent and not subject to presidential influ-
ence or control.  Many other examples can be cited of executive 
branch employees carrying out statutory duties free of presidential 
interference. 
C.  Ministerial Duties 
The heads of executive departments exercise two kinds of duties.  
In part they are political agents of the President and answerable to 
him.  If he objects to their performance, he can remove them.  A sec-
ond duty, however, is not to the President but to the law.  Depart-
ment heads have a legal obligation to carry out the functions assigned 
to them by Congress.  Obviously a conflict can arise when the de-
partment head is making a good-faith effort to carry out a law, and 
the President directs the official to do something else. 
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall spoke about 
these two types of duties:  discretionary (subject to presidential con-
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trol) and “ministerial” (subject to statutory commands).49  For the lat-
ter, the duty of a public officer extends to the nation and its citizens.  
For the former, the duty is to the President alone.  Chief Justice Mar-
shall explained that when a Secretary of State performs as “an officer 
of the United States,” he is “bound to obey the laws.”50  In this capac-
ity the Secretary acts “under the authority of law, and not by the in-
structions of the President.  It is a ministerial act which the law en-
joins on a particular officer for a particular purpose.”51  A number of 
court cases decided a few decades after Marbury recognized that nei-
ther the President nor department heads possess any authority to de-
ny or control a ministerial act of a subordinate.52 
The binding, non-discretionary nature of ministerial duties was 
recognized not only by federal courts but by Attorneys General.  In 
1854, Attorney General Caleb Cushing stated that when laws 
[D]efine what is to be done by a given head of department, and how he 
is to do it, there the President’s discretion stops; but if the law require an 
executive act to be performed, without saying how or by whom, it must 
be for him to supply the direction.53 
Calabresi and Yoo discuss Cushing’s opinions, but only in terms of 
positions that appear to give the President total control over all sub-
ordinates in the agencies.54  They make no mention of Cushing’s very 
clear opinion in 1854 that recognized broad autonomy to ministerial 
decisions by executive employees. 
On many occasions, an Attorney General has told the President 
that the White House has no legal right to interfere with administra-
tive decisions.  Neither the President nor a department head could 
“revise and correct all the acts of his subordinates.  And if he could, 
as the law now stands, it would be as illegal as unwise.”55  Calabresi 
and Yoo are aware of this line of judicial rulings and opinions issued 
by Attorneys General.56  They say these precedents are “limited to 
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purely ministerial duties and would not apply to functions involving a 
degree of executive discretion.”57  Of course that is true, but to con-
cede that courts can direct executive officials to perform ministerial 
duties is to concede that the President may not direct and control all 
actions by executive branch subordinates.  Calabresi and Yoo further 
note:  “The case for a presidential power to direct subordinates is on-
ly slightly less strong as a matter of practice than is the case for a pres-
idential removal power.”58  Slightly less?  Such a concession repudiates 
their claim that all forty-three presidents “have insisted on the view 
that the Constitution gives them the power to remove and direct sub-
ordinates as to law execution.”59 
According to Calabresi and Yoo, the Supreme Court “has some-
times supported the unitary executive, as it did in Myers v. United 
States.”60  That is incorrect.  In Myers, the Court broadly supported the 
President’s removal power but at the same time recognized large ar-
eas of agency activities that lay beyond the President’s control.61  The 
decision by Chief Justice William Howard Taft upheld presidential 
power over officials who carried out purely executive duties.62  The 
passage below demonstrates that Taft understood that ministerial and 
adjudicatory duties, as exercised by agency employees, were not sub-
ject to presidential supervision and control: 
[T]here may be duties so peculiarly and specifically committed to the 
discretion of a particular officer as to raise a question whether the Presi-
dent may overrule or revise the officer’s interpretation of his statutory 
duty in a particular instance.  Then there may be duties of a quasi-judicial 
character imposed on executive officers and members of executive tri-
bunals whose decisions after hearing affect interests of individuals, the 
discharge of which the President can not in a particular case properly in-
fluence or control.  But even in such a case he may consider the decision 
after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on the ground 
that the discretion regularly entrusted to that officer by statute has not 
been on the whole intelligently or wisely exercised.  Otherwise he does 
not discharge his own constitutional duty of seeing that the laws be faith-
fully executed.63 
At the end of their book, Calabresi and Yoo conclude that “none 
of the presidents has accepted any diminution in the unity of the ex-
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ecutive branch.”64  To the extent that they accept, as Taft did, that the 
President’s power of removal is limited by ministerial and adjudica-
tory duties performed by executive officials, the authors must accept 
that Presidents and their Attorneys General understand that all sub-
ordinates are not directly controllable by the President.  The unity of 
the executive branch is diminished to that extent, which is substan-
tial.  Calabresi and Yoo further assert:  “There is thus nothing in the 
practices of our forty-three chief executives that would foreclose the 
conclusion that the Constitution gives the president sole authority 
over the execution of the law.”65  On the contrary, there is everything 
in the “practices” of forty-three Presidents to demonstrate that the 
President’s authority to carry out the law is shared with other 
branches. 
Two other issues will underscore that fundamental point:  the 
Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha66 invalidating the “legislative veto” 
and the independent counsel statute that began under the Carter 
administration and continued, with several interruptions, into the 
Clinton years. 
D.  The Legislative Veto 
In their concluding chapter, Calabresi and Yoo analyze six key 
topics:  the removal power, direction of subordinates, the civil service, 
independent agencies, independent counsels, and centralized review 
of agency regulations.67  For some reason, they do not discuss the 
continuation of legislative vetoes after Chadha.  It would be difficult to 
find a clearer repudiation of the unitary executive model than the 
practice of congressional committees and subcommittees sharing 
with executive agencies certain administrative decisions.  Chadha put 
an end to Congress exercising a legislative veto in two forms:  control 
by a single chamber (simple resolutions adopted by either house) or 
by the two chambers working jointly (concurrent resolutions).  Nei-
ther resolution goes to the President for his signature or veto.  It was 
on that ground that the Court declared those types of legislative ve-
toes unconstitutional because they violate the Presentment Clause.68  
One-house and two-house legislative vetoes were highly visible; they 
were taken up on the floor, debated, and put to vote. 
 
 64 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 431. 
 65 Id. 
 66 462 U.S. 919, 946–58 (1983). 
 67 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 417–31. 
 68 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 946–58. 
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Almost invisible are the committee and subcommittee vetoes that 
persist after Chadha.  In 1982, I predicted that regardless of what the 
Court decided about the constitutionality of the legislative veto, 
committee/subcommittee vetoes would continue because the ac-
commodation met critical needs for the executive and legislative 
branches.69  For many decades, it had been the practice of agencies to 
present for committee or subcommittee approval the shifting of 
funds within an appropriations account (the “reprogramming” proc-
ess).70  When these committee/subcommittee vetoes survived Chadha 
year after year, I published an article in 1993 to explain their durabil-
ity.71 
No one reading the book by Calabresi and Yoo would be aware 
that congressional committees and subcommittees are regularly in-
volved in agency decisions and have the capacity to approve and dis-
approve their actions.  An alert reader would note this sentence:  
“Despite [George H. W.] Bush’s attempt to object to every legislative 
veto, Reagan and Bush reportedly signed more than two hundred 
new legislative vetoes after Chadha and often complied with them.”72  
Calabresi and Yoo say that “the power to direct executive branch sub-
ordinates is an interpretation that is long settled and followed in the 
executive branch,” and that “Congress has from time to time tried to 
unsettle this interpretation, but our book demonstrates that Con-
gress’s efforts in this regard have always failed.”73  That is not true.  
Many of these congressional efforts have succeeded. 
The book contains another misconception about the legislative 
veto.  After citing some of the objections to the legislative veto by 
such Presidents as Woodrow Wilson and Herbert Hoover, Calabresi 
and Yoo claim that in Chadha the Court “specifically relied on these 
presidents’ consistent objections to this interference with their power 
over the execution of the law.”74  The objections were hardly consis-
tent.  Presidents went back and forth on the merits and demerits of 
the legislative veto.  They understood the benefit that would come 
from additional delegations of legislative authority to the executive 
branch.  It was President Hoover who first proposed that Congress 
delegate to him the authority to reorganize the executive branch, 
 
 69 Louis Fisher, Congress Can’t Lose On Its Veto Power, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1982, at D1. 
 70 Id. 
 71 See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto:  Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
273 (1993). 
 72 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 389 (citing Fisher, supra note 71, at 288 (analyzing 
why legislative vetoes of the committee variety survived after Chadha)). 
 73 Id. at 4. 
 74 Id. at 12. 
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subject to some type of legislative veto (even a committee veto).75  Ca-
labresi and Yoo admit that the one-house veto in the Economy Act of 
1932 was the result of “Hoover’s suggestions.”76 
According to Calabresi and Yoo, the Court in Chadha “noted that 
the fact that presidents dating back to Woodrow Wilson had consis-
tently questioned whether the constitutionality of the legislative veto 
was sufficient to preclude regarding the issue as being settled by his-
tory.”77  Notice the softening of language, from “consistent objec-
tions” to “consistent questioning.”  Many Presidents who “questioned” 
the legislative veto accepted it.78  Although Calabresi and Yoo fre-
quently describe Presidents as consistent in their defense of the uni-
tary executive model, there has been much inconsistency.  They note, 
“[E]very single one of our presidents has believed in the classic vision 
of the unitary executive to at least some degree and defended it from 
congressional incursions as best he could.”79  Here the defense 
amounts to a belief “to at least some degree . . . as best he could.”  
And later:  “eleven of thirteen presidents from Woodrow Wilson to 
Ronald Reagan had objected” to the legislative veto.80  Objections are 
of little weight if Presidents accept the legislative veto, as they did 
time after time.  As another admission of wavering executive policy, 
from 1889 to 1945, “presidents during this period opposed the legis-
lative veto with enough consistency.”81 
Hundreds of committee vetoes appeared in statutes after Chadha.82  
On a regular basis, Presidents used their signing statements to object 
that these provisions are unconstitutional, implying that agencies are 
free to ignore them.83  What is interesting is that not only do agencies 
comply with committee-veto provisions, they include that require-
ment in agency budget manuals that instruct executive employees 
 
 75 See FISHER, supra note 39, at 139 (discussing President Hoover’s recommendation that 
Congress delegate reorganization authority, contingent on the approval of a joint com-
mittee); see also id. at 134–44, 152–53 (noting other presidential accommodations of the 
legislative veto). 
 76 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 275. 
 77 Id. at 16. 
 78 See FISHER, supra note 39, at 139–40 (explaining how President Franklin D. Roosevelt ac-
cepted legislative vetoes despite his constitutional misgivings). 
 79 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 16. 
 80 Id. at 26. 
 81 Id. at 300 (emphasis added). 
 82 Louis Fisher, Signing Statements:  Constitutional and Practical Limits, 16 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 183, 196 (2007). 
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how to handle reprogramming actions.84  We have an interesting rou-
tine:  Presidents challenge the constitutionality of committee vetoes; 
agencies seek committee approval.85  Under the theory of a unitary 
executive, Presidents could direct all agencies to rewrite their budget 
manuals to delete any requirement for committee vetoes.  That has 
not happened yet, and there is little reason to think it will.  It is useful 
to think of not one executive but two.  There is a macro executive 
consisting of the President, White House, Justice Department, and 
the Office of Management and Budget.  They look at government 
comprehensively and address overarching principles.  There is also 
the micro executive of all the departments and agencies seeking to 
take budgetary actions throughout the fiscal year, often working in 
tandem with congressional committees and subcommittees. 
E.  Independent Counsel 
Calabresi and Yoo discuss the decision of Congress in 1978 to cre-
ate an independent counsel as part of post-Watergate reforms.  They 
say that President Jimmy Carter “had little choice but to sign the law,” 
despite “the severe misgivings of senior Carter administration officials 
about the act’s constitutionality.”86  If the unitary executive model has 
been defended as consistently as Calabresi and Yoo contend, Carter 
had a choice (as do all Presidents) in protecting his office.  If Carter 
capitulated because of a range of political calculations, that is under-
standable.  His performance, however, undermines the notion that 
the model of the unitary executive is a type of lodestar that unerr-
ingly guides all Presidents. 
The constitutionality of the independent counsel, Calabresi and 
Yoo point out, “was opposed (albeit not with complete consistency) 
by every President that followed Carter.”87  Of what value is it for Pres-
idents to “oppose” and “object” to incursions into their office if, in 
the end, they throw in the towel?  There were plenty of analyses in 
the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations that found serious con-
 
 84 See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC’Y OF DEF., DEP’T OF DEF., Reprogramming of DOD Appro-
priated Funds, in DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION 6-1 to -20 (2000), available at 
http://defenselink.mil/comptroller/fmr/03/03arch/03_06.pdf (delineating Depart-
ment of Defense procedures for submitting, approving and processing programming ac-
tions). 
 85 See LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RES. SERV., COMMITTEE CONTROLS OF AGENCY DECISIONS, at C-1 
(2005), available at http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-
7932:1. 
 86 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 426. 
 87 Id. 
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stitutional deficiencies with the office of independent counsel, even 
after the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson88 declared it constitu-
tional.89  Yet President Reagan chose to sign the independent counsel 
bill in 1983 and 1987, and President Clinton signed another exten-
sion in 1994.  Nothing in this record provides any evidence of Presi-
dents upholding the unitary executive.  Certainly it is an overstate-
ment for Calabresi and Yoo to write, “The historical record thus 
shows Ronald Reagan to be a steadfast proponent and supporter of 
the unitary executive.”90  Steadfast means firm in belief, determina-
tion, and adherence.  Someone who is unfaltering.  A different word is 
needed to describe Reagan’s record with the independent counsel. 
F.  Independent Commissions 
Calabresi and Yoo assert that “no president has acquiesced in a 
congressional power to create independent agencies.”91  It would be 
hard to find an independent agency that came into existence without 
the active and enthusiastic backing of Presidents.  Certainly Woodrow 
Wilson supported the independent agencies that appeared during his 
administration (Federal Reserve System and Federal Trade Commis-
sion).  The same can be said of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Federal Com-
munications Commission, Securities and Exchange Commission, Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, Federal Maritime Commission, and 
Civil Aeronautics Board).92  There was not only support from Presi-
dents but clear advocacy and the drafting of legislation presented to 
Congress. 
It is true, as Calabresi and Yoo note, that the Interstate Commerce 
Commission “was not originally an independent agency when it was 
created in 1887.”93  The agency had various ties to the Secretary of the 
Interior; decisions by the commission regarding employment and fix-
ing of salaries were subject to the approval of the Secretary.  Expendi-
tures were approved by the head of the commission and the Secre-
tary.  The commission reported to the Secretary each year.94  
 
 88 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
 89 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 359, 365–66, 376–77, 386. 
 90 Id. at 383. 
 91 Id. at 16. 
 92 See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLITICS OF SHARED POWER:  CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE 149 
(4th ed. 1998). 
 93 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 423. 
 94 See FISHER, supra note 92, at 152. 
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However, Congress severed those links two years later.95  Calabresi 
and Yoo observe that members of Congress “consistently referred to 
the ICC as part of the executive branch.”96  True.  It could not be in 
the legislative branch or the judicial branch because it functioned to 
carry out the law.  Location does not minimize independent status.  
Similarly, Calabresi and Yoo point out that Presidents regarded the 
FTC “as an executive agency charged with executive and administra-
tive duties.”97  True also.  Independent agencies carry out executive 
and administrative duties but possess an element of autonomy not 
present in other executive agencies, including multimember bodies 
that have terms of office staggered to insulate them from presidential 
transitions.98  Calabresi and Yoo do not discuss the multimember sta-
tus or the staggered terms. 
G.  Removal of U.S. Attorneys 
In 2006, the Bush administration removed nine U.S. Attorneys, 
supposedly for poor performance.  Calabresi and Yoo say that Presi-
dent Bush “removed several U.S. attorneys for their failure to execute 
the law in the manner that Bush thought it should be executed.”99  
Had Bush done that, it would be a good example of a President up-
holding the theory of a unitary executive, which is “to promote ac-
countability by making it crystal clear who is to blame for maladminis-
tration.”100  Repeated congressional hearings in the House and the 
Senate, however, could not locate in these firings any explicit actions 
or decisions by Bush, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, or other 
top executive officials.  Mid-level officials in the White House and the 
Justice Department, most of them in their thirties, were called to tes-
tify about their involvement.  One would think the removal and ap-
pointment of U.S. Attorneys would be a quintessential presidential 
matter, closely monitored by the Chief Executive and the White 
House.  One should be able to trace the firings of the U.S. Attorneys 
to presidential policy, assuring accountability and control.  But Bush 
 
 95 See Act to Regulate Commerce, ch. 104, §§ 18, 21, 24 Stat. 379, 386–87 (1887), amended by 
Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 382, §§ 7–8, 25 Stat. 855, 861–62 (1889)(providing that the com-
mission could independently decide matters involving employment, fixed compensation 
and reimbursable expenses, and also make annual reports directly to Congress). 
 96 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 423. 
 97 Id. at 424. 
 98 See FISHER, supra note 92, at 151, 153, 155. 
 99 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 48, at 12. 
100 Id. at 3. 
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seemed absent and unengaged, as did Gonzales and other high ex-
ecutive officials. 
According to Calabresi and Yoo, it “gradually became apparent 
that the White House had played a major role in the dismissals, and 
some evidence emerged that Karl Rove, Bush’s senior political ad-
viser, had been involved.”101  Rove’s involvement, whatever it was, 
hardly offers support for the model of a unitary executive.  The per-
son directed by the Constitution to see that the laws are faithfully 
executed is the President, not his political adviser.  At the top levels 
of the Bush administration there was no accountability. 
Calabresi and Yoo are correct that U.S. Attorneys “serve at the 
pleasure of the president and can be removed at will at any time.  
This is a basic axiom of the unitary executive.”102  It is also an axiom of 
the unitary executive that the accountable official is the President.  
No one can reasonably argue that a senior political adviser in the 
White House may remove U.S. attorneys at will.  Calabresi and Yoo 
understand the political (and constitutional) damage done by the fir-
ings.  They explain, “[r]emoving U.S. attorneys or directing prosecu-
tions to accomplish partisan goals, for example, to help Republicans 
win elections, would be an unconstitutional act.  It would violate the 
First Amendment and would be an abuse of the executive power.”103  
Further, a President or Attorney General who used “[the] power of 
prosecution for political ends has committed a high crime and mis-
demeanor,” meriting impeachment and removal.104  Congress at-
tempted to learn more about these dismissals by calling Rove and 
former White House Counsel Harriet Miers to testify and sought 
documents from White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolten.  In re-
sponse to this effort to determine accountability, the Bush admini-
stration issued legal advice that blocked testimony by Rove and Miers 
and prevented the release of further White House documents to 
Congress.105 
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(considering the claims invoking executive privilege following House Judiciary Commit-
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IV.  INHERENT POWERS 
Throughout the book, Calabresi and Yoo treat implied powers 
and inherent powers as equivalent and interchangeable.  Their re-
view of presidential practice over more than two centuries “reveals 
that the historical support for a sustained tradition of presidential as-
sertion of implied, inherent executive power during times of national 
emergency is modest, in stark contrast to the strong support for a 
tradition of inherent presidential power of direction, nullification, 
and removal.”106  The record across forty-three presidential admini-
strations “shows that claims of broad, inherent, implied powers were 
rare.”107  They offer support to a President who exercises “a narrow 
implied, inherent power to protect the instrumentalities of govern-
ment even in the absence of specific statutory authorization.”108  They 
claim that the “most sweeping assertion of inherent executive power 
was Abraham Lincoln’s claim of emergency powers during the spring 
of 1861.”109 
It is misleading to mix the terms of implied, inherent, and emer-
gency powers.  They need to be kept separate and distinct.  First, an 
implied power can be reasonably drawn from an express power.  Be-
cause it is an express duty of the President to see that the laws are 
faithfully executed, any executive officer who prevents a law from be-
ing carried out can be removed by the President.  The implied power 
to remove is derived from an express power.  Congress is granted the 
express power to legislate.  To legislate in an informed manner, it has 
an implied power to investigate, issue subpoenas, and hold in con-
tempt those who interfere with a proper investigation.  All three 
branches have implied powers.  They are necessary to the Constitu-
tion and consistent with it. 
Lincoln exercised emergency powers after the start of the Civil 
War but never regarded them as either “implied” or “inherent.”  He 
made no claim that his actions were fully constitutional or that they 
could be justified by some language within Article II.  When Congress 
returned after its recess, Lincoln sent a message explaining that his 
emergency actions, “whether strictly legal or not,” were taken as a 
public necessity, “trusting then, as now, that Congress would readily 
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ratify them.”110  With those words Lincoln signaled two facts:  he was 
not claiming full legality for what he did, and for that reason he 
needed Congress to authorize what he had done, even if retroac-
tively.  The superior lawmaking body was Congress, not the President.  
Lincoln underscored that point by admitting that he had exercised 
both Article I and Article II powers, advising Congress that his actions 
were not “beyond the constitutional competency of Congress.”111  He 
did not invoke express, implied, or inherent powers to justify his ac-
tions, which were emergency measures requiring legislative approval.  
After debating his request, Congress passed the necessary legisla-
tion.112 
According to Calabresi and Yoo, the decision by President George 
W. Bush to rely “on the advice of Berkeley law professor John Yoo to 
make sweeping claims of implied, inherent presidential power in the 
War on Terror are best seen as following in the tradition established 
by Jefferson, Lincoln, the two Roosevelts, and Nixon.”113  That is a 
shallow argument.  Those Presidents did not claim, as Bush did, that 
they could violate statutes and treaties in pursuit of national security 
policies.  They either came to Congress for statutory authority or, in 
the case of Nixon, claimed “inherent” power to impound appropri-
ated funds or conduct domestic surveillance until Congress and the 
courts invalidated those initiatives.114 
Having apparently defended Bush’s reliance on John Yoo and 
others in his administration who advocated unchecked presidential 
power, Calabresi and Yoo next argue: 
Although Bush deserves a lot of credit for his steps to safeguard the 
country, the cost of the bad legal advice that he received is that Bush has 
discredited the theory of the unitary executive by associating it not with 
presidential authority to remove and direct subordinate executive offi-
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cials but with implied, inherent foreign policy powers, some of which, at 
least, the president simply does not possess.115 
If the unitary executive means anything, the blame falls entirely on 
Bush, not his legal advisers.  Otherwise there is no accountability in 
the presidency and the model of a unitary executive is a sham. 
I partly agree with Calabresi and Yoo that “[a]ccepting the theory 
of the unitary executive does not necessarily require accepting the 
claims of inherent executive power advanced by the Bush administra-
tion.”116  It was not necessary, but the theory of the unitary executive 
became a handy model to be used repeatedly and crudely by the 
Bush administration to claim broad presidential powers in the field of 
national security that could not be restrained by Congress or the 
courts.117  When Congress in 2005 passed legislation to prohibit (once 
again) torture of detainees, in his signing statement President Bush 
dismissed the binding nature of the statutory prohibition with these 
words:  “The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of 
the Act, relating to detainees, in a manner consistent with the consti-
tutional authority of the President to supervise the unitary executive 
branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with the constitu-
tional limitations on the judicial power.”118 
Calabresi and Yoo propose that their theory of the unitary execu-
tive can be preserved by adopting “a limited view of inherent execu-
tive power.”119  I will argue why that is not possible.  The Constitution 
is protected when Presidents act under express and implied powers.  
It was protected when Lincoln exercised emergency powers and then 
publicly expressed the need for Congress to sanction by statute what 
he had done.  Now consider inherent power, which has been defined 
in this manner: “An authority possessed without its being derived 
from another. . . . [P]owers over and beyond those explicitly granted 
in the Constitution or reasonably to be implied from express 
grants.”120  It is clearly set apart from express and implied powers.  
That definition remained in the sixth edition of Black’s Law Dictionary 
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but dropped out of the current eighth edition, which carries this ex-
planation of inherent power:  “A power that necessarily derives from 
an office, position, or status.”121 
A constitution protects individual rights and liberties by specifying 
and limiting government.  Express and implied powers serve that 
purpose.  The claim of “inherent” powers ushers in a range of vague 
and abstruse sources of authority.  What “inheres” in the President?  
The standard collegiate dictionary explains that “inherent” describes 
the “essential character of something:  belonging by nature or ha-
bit.”122  How would citizens, Congress, or the courts know what is es-
sential or part of nature?  The dictionary makes a cross-reference to 
“intrinsic,” which can mean within a body or organ (as distinct from 
extrinsic) but also something “belonging to the essential nature or 
constitution of a thing[,]” such as the “[intrinsic] worth of a gem” or 
the “[intrinsic] brightness of a star.”123  Nebulous words such as “in-
herent,” “essential,” “nature,” and “intrinsic” invite political abuse 
and endanger individual liberties. 
“Inherent” can imply superior, exclusive, and enduring.  The verb 
“inhere” is used to describe a fixed element, including the belief that 
“all virtue inhered in the farmer” or the “excellence inhering in the 
democratic faith.”124  “Inherence” may imply a power that has “per-
manent existence as an attribute.”125  “Inherence” is associated with a 
quality that is settled or established, as “belonging by nature or set-
tled habit.”126  Presidents who claim inherent powers move a nation 
from one of limited powers to boundless and ill-defined authority, 
undermining the doctrine of separated powers and the system of 
checks and balances.  Assertions of inherent powers in the last six 
decades include President Truman’s initiation of war in Korea in 
1950 and his seizure of steel mills two years later.  President George 
W. Bush and his legal advisers claimed he had inherent power to cre-
ate military tribunals, issue “torture memos” by the Justice Depart-
ment, adopt the policy of “extraordinary rendition” to send detainees 
to other countries for interrogation and torture, and authorize NSA 
surveillance after 9/11.127  Through such actions, justified at every 
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turn by inherent authority, the administration functioned as an un-
constitutional government. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
Much of The Unitary Executive consists of a rich framework filled 
with detailed accounts of Presidents seeking to protect their adminis-
trative duties.  Anyone reading the book will discover material that is 
of great interest to contemporary debates over executive prerogatives, 
separation of powers, and constitutional law.  Calabresi and Yoo often 
exaggerate the purity of the unitary executive model, conceding at 
points that presidential behavior has not been consistent and ignor-
ing at other times evidence that would show the behavior even more 
inconsistent than they admit.  They say their book “shows that all of 
our nation’s presidents have believed in the theory of the unitary ex-
ecutive.”128  Whatever the “beliefs” of the forty-three Presidents, clear-
ly they were often willing to set aside theory for pragmatic accommo-
dations with Congress. 
To Calabresi and Yoo, the Constitution “gives presidents the pow-
er to control their subordinates by vesting all of the executive power 
in one, and only one, person:  the president of the United States.”129  
The President can control subordinates to the extent of assuring that 
they are faithfully carrying out the law.  If they are, he has no business 
interfering and no authority to ask his department heads or White 
House staff to intervene.  Otherwise, agency employees handling so-
cial security payments and veterans’ claims, among other administra-
tive tasks, would have their professional, ministerial work interrupted 
by political officials who probably have political and partisan agendas.  
Any administration that functioned in that manner would be justifia-
bly condemned.  Much of the work of subordinates in the Executive 
Branch is off-limits to the President and for very good reason.  Cala-
bresi and Yoo appear to acknowledge that point, pointing out that 
“[a]ll subordinate nonlegislative and nonjudicial officials exercise ex-
ecutive power, and they do so only by implicit or explicit delegation 
from the president.”130  Adjudicatory duties within the executive pow-
er are carried out to satisfy the explicit direction of Congress through 
statutorily assigned tasks. 
There is much to learn from The Unitary Executive.  It is an ambi-
tious project that has taken years to complete, building on highly de-
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tailed articles initially published in law journals.  The model pre-
sented by Calabresi and Yoo appears to be based on an incontroverti-
ble principle:  the need to vest power in the President to assure that 
laws are faithfully executed.  Any limitations on that core duty, they 
argue, would interfere with power vested in the President by Article II 
and put at risk the individual liberties that depend on the rule of law.  
There is a basic problem with this argument.  The Constitution does 
not empower the President to carry out the law.  That would be an 
impossible assignment.  It empowers the President to see that the law 
is faithfully carried out.  The great bulk of that work is done by Ex-
ecutive Branch employees who remain legitimately outside the Presi-
dent’s direct control provided they faithfully discharge their assigned 
tasks. 
The unitary executive model became a convenient framework to 
justify constitutional and legal violations by the Bush II administra-
tion.  The rule of law depends on more than strong, centralized, well-
motivated Presidents.  It requires Presidents to understand that they 
are under the law like every other person.  Justice Robert Jackson put 
it well:  “With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have 
discovered no technique for long preserving free government except 
that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made by par-
liamentary deliberations.”131 
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